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Abstract This paper offers a more comprehensive and accurate picture of 
Edmund Husserl’s semiotics. I not only clarify, as many have already done, 
Husserl’s theory of signs from the 1901 Logical Investigations, but also 
examine how he transforms that element of his philosophy in the 1913/14 
Revisions to the Sixth Logical Investigation. Specifically, the paper examines 
the evolution of two central tenets of Husserl’s semiotics. I first look at how 
he modifies his classification of signs. I disclose why he revised his 1901 
distinction between indicators and expressions, instead claiming in 1913/14 
that the divisions should be drawn between indicators, signals, and categorial 
signs. Second, I elucidate why Husserl overturned his conclusion from the 
Investigations, that signs execute their signitive operations in three steps, 
because he recognizes that categorial signs and their meant object are 
experienced all at once. By exploring the transformation of these two tenets 
of Husserl’s semiotics, we will see that he conceived of the First Inves-
tigation only as a starting or jumping off point for future analyses of signitive 
experience, rather than as his final account. This analysis will further reveal 
novel insights about Husserl’s understanding of intersubjectivity, passivity, 
and temporality. 
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Introduction 
Edmund Husserl begins his 1901 Logical Investigations (Hua XIX/1970; 
hereafter Investigations)1 by engaging in a descriptive analysis of the ex-
perience of signs. He there arrives at two insights, which are not only central 
to his semiotics, but also foundational for his descriptive psychology as a 
whole. He concludes that signitive experiences occur in three abstract steps 
and that there are two kinds of signs, indications (Anzeigen) and expressions 
(Ausdrücke). These two observations and Husserl’s clarifications of them 
have frequently been taken in the literature as Husserl’s definitive statements 
regarding signitive experiences (cf. De Palma 2008; Simons 1995; 
Sokolowski 2002; Urban 2010; Zhu 2013).2 This interpretation is not without 
seemingly good justification, as the First Logical Investigation is the only 
text, which Husserl published during his lifetime, wherein he executes an 
extensive and systematic analysis of the experience of signs. 
Yet, in many of the texts that Husserl left unpublished, he expresses 
strong dissatisfaction with his semiotics from the Investigations and asserts 
that the insights from that book should never be taken as his final word on 
the topic of signs. He continued to dedicate great efforts to amending his 
1901 observations concerning signs. While one can find traces of these 
alterations scattered throughout his Nachlass, Husserl’s single greatest 
transformation of this part of his philosophy occurs when he returns to revise 
his Sixth Logical Investigation in 1913/14 (Hua XX-1/2; hereafter 
Revisions). In the manuscripts that comprise that text, Husserl alters both 
central doctrines of his semiotics, as he established them in 1901. He 
reverses the idea that signitive experiences occur by means of a three-step 
process and he differentiates signs in a new way, asserting that there are 
indications (Anzeigen), authentic non-categorial signal signs (Signale), and 
authentic categorial signs (kategoriale Zeichen). 
The goal of this paper is to present a robust and more accurate picture 
of Husserl’s semiotics, that is, to augment the current interpretations of his 
                                                     
1 All translations will be mine. I provide references to the corresponding English 
translation where available, following a slash after the Hua page number. Quotes 
from the Logical Investigations always come from the First Edition. 
2 To quote one interpreter who maintains this view, Peer Bundgaard begins his 
article on Husserl’s semiotics — which he composed after the publication of both 
Hua XX-1/2! — by writing, “From a purely quantitative point of view, Edmund 
Husserl has devoted a rather small amount of time and space to the study of 
language proper. Essentially, his contributions within this domain amount to the 
description of language use in the First Logical Investigation” (2010, p. 368).  
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theory of signs, by discussing the two core doctrines of Husserl’s semiotics 
from 1901 and then by revealing how he alters them in 1913/14. By 
examining the reasons why Husserl found it necessary to change the way he 
conceived of signs and by clarifying how he executed those revisions, so also 
will the problems that originally motivated him and continued to impel him 
to study signitive experiences be disclosed. 
To accomplish that task, the following paper is divided into three 
sections. The first section examines the two central doctrines of Husserl’s 
semiotics from Investigations. (1.1) I begin by clarifying Husserl’s idea that 
signitive experiences ensue in three steps and then examine his divisions 
between and definitions of (1.2) indicative signs and (1.3) expressive signs. 
In section two, I analyze how Husserl overturns those two tenets by 
elucidating the three manuscripts from Revisions, wherein he executes his 
most substantial and clear transformation of his theory of signs. The structure 
of this second section is the inverse of the first, as I begin with an analysis of 
how Husserl reconstructs his 1901 differentiation of signs. (2.1) In the first 
pertinent manuscript, Husserl provides a general introduction to the new 
division between indicators and authentic signs, under which fall signals and 
categorial signs. In the second manuscript, Husserl goes on to lay out in a 
more precise manner, (2.2) the distinctions he sees between the operations of 
indications and of signals and, in the third text, (2.3) he clarifies his division 
between the two kinds of authentic signs. In that third manuscript, Husserl 
formulates his novel separation of signals and categorial signs, by revising 
the other core tenet of his semiotics, that signitive experiences occur in three 
stages. Finally, (3) I provide brief concluding remarks about how Husserl 
composed and structured these manuscripts and, on the basis of those 
comments, I postulate how phenomenological semiotics can be conducted 
moving forward.1 
                                                     
1 While this paper demonstrates how Husserl works beyond his First Logical 
Investigation, it must be noted that that text is not without its own history: The First 
Investigation is itself a revision of the 1891, “On the Logic of Signs (Semiotic)” 
(Hua XII, pp. 340–373/1994, pp. 20–51). In several of my other works (Byrne 
2017a, 2017b, 2017c), I examine Husserl’s early semiotics from that 1891 manu-
script in detail, elucidate why he first became interested in clarifying the distinct 
experiences of signs, and demonstrate how “On the Logic of Signs” serves as the 
palimpsest for the First Investigation. As such, by pairing those articles with this text, 
a complete picture of the development of Husserl’s semiotics from 1891–1914 can 
come into view. 
Bull. anal. phén. XIV 5 (2018) 
https://popups.uliege.be/1782-2041/ © 2018 ULiège BAP 
4
1.1 Signs 
In this whole section, I clarify the two tenets of Husserl’s semiotics from 
1901, where this will open up the possibility for me, in the next section, to 
disclose how Husserl transforms those two. Because Husserl’s 1913/14 
alterations to the Investigations are just that — alterations and not an 
unconditional starting over — his analyses from 1901 must first be 
understood before one can begin to grasp his theory of signs from Revisions. 
The first doctrine that I examine is the idea that signitive experiences are 
executed in three stages. I outline these three phases sequentially now. 
The first step may occur when I simply intuit some object. Husserl 
defines intuitive intentions (intuitive Intentionen), as those acts that are 
directed at correlates, which are apparent (Hua XIX, p. 610/1970, p. 236). 
The intuitive act is one that discloses an object or property, which is set 
directly before my eyes or my mind’s eye. I see the object by means of 
perception or via imagination or memory. As such, if any signifying 
experience is to occur, I must first be intuitively conscious of an apparent 
object. 
The second step begins when the intuited object arouses an associative 
motivation in me. I experience the motivation of the apparent object because 
— at some time in the past — an associative connection or link was 
established between this object and another object.1 Once that link has been 
solidified, when the one object is apparent before me, that is, intuited, the 
link is reawakened and I experience an associative motivation to become 
aware of the other object, which is not currently apparent. When I experience 
the intuited object as something that motivates me to become aware of 
another non-apparent object, I am experiencing the former as something that 
points beyond itself, that is, I experience it as a sign. (Hua XIX p. 46/1970 
p. 193). 
The third phase is the execution of the intending of the non-apparent 
object, which is experienced as that which the sign is pointing at, that is, as 
the signified. This intending of the signified object is what Husserl calls a 
“signitive” intention (signitiv Intention). By signitively intending the 
signified object, it is not the case that the object is then apparent to me. When 
signitively intended, the signified object remains non-apparent. In fact, 
                                                     
1 I have discussed the nature of this associative motivation at length in Byrne 2017b. 
I there examine the history and development of that concept of associative 
motivation in Husserl’s thought, with regards to its operation both in signitive 
experience and in our experiential life at large. 
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Husserl defines signitive intentions as those that are directed at objects or 
parts of objects that are non-apparent. Husserl writes that a signitive 
presentation, “is ‘authentically’ no ‘presentation’, in it nothing of the object 
comes to life (wird in ihr nichts lebendig)” (Hua XIX, p. 607/1970, p. 233).  
This total three-step experience thus involves the intuitive intending of 
an apparent object, the experience of that apparent object as a sign, which 
arouses an associative motivation in me, and the motivated signitive 
intending of the signified and non-apparent object. To conclude this brief 
section, I highlight that Husserl conceived of these three as moments and not 
as pieces of one whole process. An intuitive intending of a sign cannot be 
experienced in isolation from the signitive intending of a signified and vice 
versa (Hua XIX, p. 586/1970, pp. 218–219). The essences of the sign and of 
the signified are mutually co-grounding, as one cannot be experienced 
without the other (Hua XIX, p. 586/1970, p. 219). 
1.2 Indicative Signs 
The second core tenet of Husserl’s semiotics, which he will revise in his 
1913/14 research manuscripts, is that signs can be classified as indicative 
signs or as expressive signs. Forgoing any further introductory comments, I 
begin the analysis of this tenet of his thought by noting that the first kind of 
signs that Husserl identifies in his First Logical Investigation is that of 
indicative signs. Throughout this sub-partition, I elucidate Husserl’s 
definition and description of these signs (Hua XIX, pp. 30–37/1970, pp. 183–
187) by applying his insights to the classical example of indication, where 
smoke indicates fire. 
Even before analyzing how Husserl differentiates indicators from 
expressions, it must first be noted why he classifies indicators as signs in the 
first place. He does so because the experience of them concords directly with 
the three-step schema, which was outlined in section 1.1 above. When I see 
the smoke, it is initially intuited by me as any other apparent perceptual 
object. The smoke can then be recognized as a sign for the fire, because an 
associative tie has been previously established between the smoke and the 
fire. After having seen, either on one or several occasions, fire produce 
smoke, I come to associate the one with the other. Once that tie has been 
installed, when I again perceive the smoke, the associative link is 
reawakened, and I am then motivated to signitively intend the non-apparent 
fire (Hua XIX, p. 36/1970, p. 186). When I see the smoke, it manifests itself 
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to me as a sign, which points beyond itself to the signified fire, which I am 
associatively impelled to signitively intend. 
According to Husserl, such indicative signs have three defining 
features, which distinguish them from expressive signs in essential ways. The 
first is that any indicating sign is not only intended in an intuitive fashion, but 
that it must be given to me in a perceptual fashion. In being perceptually 
intended, I experience the object, which will function as the sign, as 
something that really exists. When I perceive the smoke on the horizon, I do 
not experience it as a mirage, but as something that is really there in the 
world. The second characteristic of an indicative sign is that it not only 
motivates me to signitively intend another object or property, but that it 
motivates me to signitively intend that signified object as an object that also 
exists. I am motivated by the appearance of the smoke to signitively intend 
the fire and to intend it as something that exists. Third, an indicative sign 
must provide me with good grounds to believe in the existence of the 
signified. The smoke, intended as existent, not only motivates my signitive 
intending of the fire, which is also experienced as existing, but also provides 
strong evidence for the existence of the fire. Husserl writes that the indicating 
sign, “not merely recalls another object and in this way points to it; rather, it 
also provides evidence for that other object. It fosters the acceptance of the 
fact that it likewise exists ….” (Hua XIX, p. 37/1970, p. 187).  
To be emphasized is that I do not come to signitively intend the fire as 
existing as a result of a deduction. I do not have to think (categorially 
intend); there is real smoke, real smoke is created by real fire; therefore, there 
is a real fire. The reawakening of the associative link occurs immediately and 
without any intellectual mediation (Hua XIX, pp. 32–37/1970, pp. 184–187). 
1.3 Expressive Signs 
The second kind of signs, which Husserl examines in the First Investigation, 
is expressive signs. Husserl believes, for reasons that shall soon become 
clear, that only linguistic signs can perform an expressive signitive function. 
To begin my analysis of expressive linguistic signs, I note that they also 
operate in accordance with the three-steps outlined in section one. During the 
first stage, when I am presented with the written words signs, “There is a 
blackbird”, I do not yet see what is written as words, but instead intuit these 
objects as scribbles on a page, which are given to me as physical objects like 
any other (Husserl calls such seen or heard physical objects, which will have 
a motivational and expressive signitive function, “Wortlaute”). The seen 
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scribbles can then awaken an associative tie and motivate me to execute a 
signitive intention, which is directed at the signified, such that the intuited 
scribbles are then functioning as expressive word signs. Husserl writes, “The 
function of a word (or rather of an intuitive word-presentation) is to awaken 
[another] act in ourselves …” (Hua XIX, p. 46/1970, p. 193). In other words, 
the intuited expressive signs, by awakening their associative link, motivate 
me to signitively intend the non-apparent blackbird as being there and to 
intend it as that which is expressed and signified by those words. 
There are two characteristics of the signitive operation of expressive 
signs that defines them as expressive signs and distinguishes them from 
indicative signs. First, neither the expressive sign nor the object signified by 
that sign have to be taken as existent (Hua XIX, pp. 41–43/1970, pp. 190–
191). When I imagine the words, “There is a blackbird”, which I do not 
intend as existing in the world, the words can perform their signitive function 
just as well as when I perceived those words as existent. If I were, in another 
case, to be presented with the expressive signs, “Jupiter is angry”, those word 
signs can motivate me to signitively intend the King of the Greek Pantheon 
as being angry, even though I do not intend him as a Deity that exists. 
Naturally, this also means that the expressive sign does not have to motivate 
or provide good grounds for my belief in the reality of the signified (Hua 
XIX, pp. 42–43/1970, pp. 191). 
The second defining feature of expressive signs is that they are 
structured in accordance with a grammatical system. Husserl’s critical insight 
is that expressive linguistic signs cannot just be grammatically organized in 
any way. Rather, their grammatical structure must be isomorphic with the 
structures of certain other elements of the signitive experience and of the 
signified. The grammatical structure of the linguistic expressive signs needs 
to parallel the categorial structure of the signified state of affairs, the 
signitive intention, and the meaning of the signitive intention. I elucidate 
these isomorphic relations by examining them individually. Moreover, to 
properly disclose how Husserl understands these structural parallels, I will 
contrast each isomorphic pair for expressive signs to the same pair for 
indicative signs. The precise nature of this methodology for clarifying 
Husserl’s insights will become clearer through its implementation, which I 
realize now. 
First, I examine the isomorphism between the sign and its signified for 
both indicative and expressive signs. Indicative signs indeed do have 
something like an isomorphism with their signified objects, as they both have 
a similar structure, in that they both have no structure. The indicative smoke-
sign confronts me in one blow and in a straightforward manner and the 
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signified of the indicative sign also confronts me in one blow: the signified 
lacks a structure. I am made aware of the intended non-structured fire via the 
indication of the non-structured smoke.1 In contrast, when I read the 
expressive linguistic signs, “Aphrodite is beautiful”, those signs possess a 
grammatical structure and this grammatical organization is directly paralleled 
in the organization of the signs’ signified state of affairs. The word, 
“Aphrodite”, occupies the grammatical subject-position, the word, 
“beautiful”, has the predicative position, and the word, “is”, grammatically 
has the role of predicating. The signified state of affairs of these expressive 
signs is structured in a directly parallel manner: Aphrodite is signitively 
presented as the subject to whom the predicate of beauty is predicated (Hua 
XIX, pp. 314–316, 663–693/1970, pp. 53–55, 275–294). Husserl conceives 
of this structure of the signified state of affairs to be an intellectual, or as he 
terms it, a “categorial” structure.   
The second isomorphism is between the sign and the signitive act that 
it motivates. The signified fire and Aphrodite are not just signitively intended 
as respectively unstructured and structured because their corresponding signs 
respectively lack and have organization. Rather, those signified objects are so 
presented because, when I see their signs, they motivate me to execute 
signitive intentions that are unstructured or structured in parallel ways. The 
unorganized indicative smoke-sign motivates me to execute a straightforward 
or “single-rayed” (einstrahlig) signitive intention, which is directed at the 
smoke in an unstructured manner. The grammatically structured expressive 
signs motivate me to execute an intellectually structured or “categorial” 
signitive intention,2 which is directed at the categorially structured state of 
affairs (Hua XIX, pp. 39–41/1970, pp. 189–190). The grammatical subject-
sign, “Aphrodite”, motivates me to perform an intention, which is so 
structured, that it categorially places Aphrodite as the subject. The predicate-
sign, “beautiful”, associatively impels me to execute a categorial intention, 
                                                     
1 This is not to deny that perceptual objects do have a structure. In the Investigations, 
Husserl asserts that there is already an, “obvious complexity that can be shown to 
exist in the content of the simple act of perception” (Hua XIX, p. 676/1970, p. 283). 
At the same time, he emphasizes that the structure of perceptual objects is not of a 
categorial or intellectual nature. 
2 Husserl alternatively calls signitive categorial intentions, “meaning-giving acts” 
(bedeutungsverlierende Akte), because they are the only acts that can be signitively 
directed at the signified objects of expressive signs, such that they alone can give 
meaning to those signs; cf. Bernet 2008, pp. 191–199; Mayer and Erhard 2008; 
Melle 1989; Mohanty 1976, pp. 24–53.  
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which is directed at the beauty as a predicate. And the expressive sign, “is”, 
motivates me to relate the predicate to the subject as one of its properties.1  
Finally, there is the isomorphism between the meaning of the signitive 
categorial act and the expressive signs.2 As there are many problems with 
Husserl’s theory of meaning in 1901, which cannot be fully addressed here,3 
I simply summarize Husserl’s conclusions about that isomorphism by stating 
that Husserl believes that the subject-sign, predicating-verbal-sign, and 
predicate-sign directly correspond to a subject-meaning, a predicating-
verbal-meaning, and a predicate-meaning (Hua XIX, p. 313/1970, p. 55).4  
To conclude this analysis of Husserl’s semiotics from 1901, I examine 
his insight that one object can function, at the same time, as an indicating 
sign and as an expressive sign. Specifically, he believes that linguistic signs, 
as I experience them when another speaks to me, can both indicate the 
intentions or acts of the speaker and express a state of affairs. 
Husserl concludes that linguistic signs can perform an indicative 
operation during communication, because he recognizes that when my 
conversation partner talks to me, I not only experience the sounds that she 
makes with her mouth as really existing sounds, but am also motivated by 
those existing sounds to become aware of the fact that she is executing a 
categorial intention, where I intend her categorial intention as an act that 
exists. The existence of the spoken words motivates and gives good grounds 
                                                     
1 These activities of categorial forming are not executed in isolation from each other 
and then subsequently brought together, but are instead moments of one whole 
categorial forming. They are intimately intertwined, as all are necessary for the 
intending of the categorial relation; cf. Hua XIX, p. 699/1970, p. 298. See also: 
Benoist 2008, pp. 125–127; Hanna 1984, pp. 324–326. 
2 I cannot, in this paragraph, juxtapose the isomorphism of expressive signs and their 
meanings to the isomorphism of indicative signs and their meanings, because 
indicative signs have no corresponding meanings. Meanings are always categorially 
structured and, because indicative signs have no categorial structure, they do not 
have meanings, which could be isomorphic to them. 
3 What can be mentioned is that the chief problem with Husserl’s 1901 philosophy of 
meaning is that, on his account, it seems that I can only become conscious of a 
meaning by first internally perceiving my categorial act and then, on that basis, 
execute an ideation, whereby the act-species — that is, the meaning — would be 
intuited. For further clarification of this point, see Bernet et al. 1993, pp. 38–43; 
Mohanty 1974, 1976. 
4 This tenet of Husserl’s thought — that expressive signs are isomorphic to their 
meanings — has been extensively discussed in the literature. I refer the reader 
specifically to; Byrne 2017c; Drummond 2003, 2007; Edie 1972; Hanna 1984; 
Sokolowski 1968.  
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for my belief in the reality that she is performing a categorial act, which is 
giving those sounds meaning (cf. note two on page eight above). In other 
words, the existent “linguistic” signs indicate the existence of her categorial 
act (Hua XIX, p. 39/1970, p. 189).1 Because her categorial act cannot be 
apparent to me, as her own intentions can only ever be apparent to her, my 
motivated intending of her indicated categorial act is a signitive act. All of 
this is to say that when my interlocutor speaks to me, it is not the case that I 
perceive her as a noise-machine, which is simply producing different guttural 
sounds. I instead signitively intend her own categorial act and thus 
experience her as one who is thinking. I see her as an existing fellow subject 
in the world who is attempting to communicate with me.  
Husserl claims that it is because I take my interlocutor as one who is 
trying to communicate with me, that I can approach the physical noises that 
she is making as expressive signs. Because I experience those sign’s as 
expressive signs, I can be motivated by them to categorially intend the 
signified state of affairs. With these conclusions, Husserl is affirming that 
oral communication is achievable because these signs perform their 
indicative function during conversation: The indication of the speaker’s 
intention allows for me to take the signs as expressive and as communicative. 
Husserl writes that communication, “becomes a possibility if the listener also 
understands the speaker’s intention. He does this inasmuch as he takes the 
speaker to be a person, who is not merely uttering sounds but speaking to 
him, who is accompanying those sounds with certain meaning-giving acts” 
(Hua XIX, p. 39/1970, p. 189).2 
 
                                                     
1 Husserl terms this specific function of signs, “intimation” (kundgeben): The spoken 
signs “intimate” the intentions of the speaker to the listener. While some may want to 
draw a sharp distinction between intimation and indication, close analysis of the text 
reveals that Husserl does not understand intimation as an essentially distinct function 
of signs, but rather only as one kind of indication. He introduces that novel term only 
to highlight the important communicative role, which indication plays in this specific 
intersubjective context. 
2 The indication of the categorial act of the speaker for the listener is what Husserl 
calls, indication or intimation in its “narrow sense” (Hua XIX, p. 39/1970, p. 189). 
The word signs can also indicate in the “wider sense” of the term, when they indicate 
to the listener that the speaker is executing additional intentions. For example, when 
another expresses that she is wishing for something, her words not only indicate, in 
the narrow sense, that she is performing a categorial act, but also, indicate, in the 
wider sense, that she is wishing (Hua XIX, p. 39/1970, p. 189).  
Bull. anal. phén. XIV 5 (2018) 
https://popups.uliege.be/1782-2041/ © 2018 ULiège BAP 
11
2.1 Indications, Signal Signs, Categorial Signs 
Husserl is not content with his 1901 semiotics and therefore returns, in his 
1913/14 Revisions, to amend both central tenets of his theory of signs. In the 
following sections, I examine the three manuscripts from that Husserliana 
edition, wherein Husserl executes his most significant revisions to his 
semiotics. By elucidating these insights of Husserl’s mature semiotics, the 
primary goal of this paper will be accomplished: The analysis of those 
manuscripts will disclose a more robust and accurate picture of Husserl’s 
overarching theory of signs. We will see that Husserl did not mean for the 
First Logical Investigation to be his definitive systematic account of signs, 
but that he rather took it as a jumping off point for future studies.  
As stated in the introduction, the structure of this second section is the 
reverse of the first: I start not by examining how Husserl revises his idea, that 
signitive experiences occur in three steps, but rather by explaining how he 
reformulates his distinction between indicative and expressive signs. 
Specifically, he claims in 1913/14 that there are indicators and authentic 
signs and he differentiates authentic signs into authentic signal signs and 
authentic categorial signs. In the first manuscript, (Indications and authentic 
(expressive) signs. Categorial and non-categorial signs. Hua XX-2, pp. 51–
55; hereafter M1), which this subsection is dedicated to examining, Husserl 
only seeks to initially introduce the reader to these new classifications. He 
proposes those divisions, but does not sufficiently outline the reasons why he 
establishes them along the lines that he does. 
I begin by looking at Husserl’s transformation of the notion of 
indication. It appears at first as if he preserves his definition of indication 
from the Investigations. He writes that I experience indication, “where one 
‘fact’ [‘Tatsache’] ‘speaks for’ [spricht für] another ‘fact’”; that A exists 
(may it be a thing or an event or some kind of real or ideal state of affairs), 
guides me to the fact [darauf hinleitet], that now truly B also exists” (Hua 
XX-2, p. 51). Yet, Husserl has changed his mind about what exactly this kind 
of guidance is and how it should be termed. He claims that indications are 
not, appropriately considered, signs and he asserts that they execute no 
signitive function. He writes, “Mere indications, in this sense, I state, are not 
authentic signs, that is, signs that signify” (Hua XX-2, p. 51).  
Husserl goes on to contrast indicators to authentic signs or simply, 
signs.  He discovers that there are two kinds of authentic signs, signal signs 
and categorial signs. He differentiates these two from each other by claiming 
that signal signs are not categorially structured and are not linguistic, 
whereas he describes categorial signs as signs that are categorially structured 
Bull. anal. phén. XIV 5 (2018) 
https://popups.uliege.be/1782-2041/ © 2018 ULiège BAP 
12
and are linguistic. The important difference between indicators and authentic 
signs, according to Husserl in this first manuscript, is that authentic signs not 
only signify, but also express (Hua XX-2, p. 53). As Husserl believes that 
linguistic signs and non-linguistic signals are both authentic signs, he is 
curiously claiming that the expressive function of signs is not particular to 
language alone! Finally, Husserl claims, in line with his conclusions from 
1901, that signals and categorial signs are isomorphic to their signified 
objects. To clarify this point, Husserl examines one example of each kind of 
sign. First, the example of a signal, which Husserl provides, is that of a 
storm-siren that signifies and expresses for the fishermen the fact that a 
cyclone is inbound. This siren signal is not structured grammatically and it 
signifies and expresses the cyclone, which the fishermen also intend via 
single-rayed acts, that is, in a non-structured manner. When the fisherman 
hears the siren, he does not have to think or categorially intend, “A cyclone is 
in bound”, but can simply become straightforwardly aware of that fact. 
Categorial signs, which are still understood by Husserl in this first 
manuscript as always linguistic signs, are categorially structured and are 
isomorphic to their categorially organized state of affairs, which they signify 
and express (Hua XX-2, p. 53). 
2.2 Indicators and Signal Signs 
Having introduced the generalities of his tripartite division in M1, in the 
second manuscript (Appendix VII, “Indications as Anzeige and genuine 
signs. The Should [Sollen] with genuine signs. Artificial signs. Hua XX-2, 
pp. 96–99; hereafter M2) Husserl goes on to lay out, in a more precise 
manner, the rationale for his distinction between indications and authentic 
signs, and more specifically, between indications and authentic signals.  
Husserl recognizes that he needs to outline the reasons why he 
differentiates indications from authentic signal signs in M2, because of the 
way he defined them in M1. He there described indicators and signals as 
having an identical structure: He asserted that both are intuited objects, 
which lack grammatical organization, that point beyond themselves to 
objects, which lack categorial organization. As such, if Husserl did not offer 
any (further) reasons for why these two are distinct from each other, his 
separation of them would be unjustified.  
To address that oversight, in M2, Husserl elucidates why he 
distinguishes authentic signs from indicators by drawing from an insight of 
his Investigations. We remember that, in 1901, Husserl believed that when I 
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hear someone speak, the sounds of her voice could indicate her categorial 
intention to me, such that I then take her as a subject who is attempting to 
communicate. My awareness of her indicated categorial act not only changes 
the way I see her, but also how I perceive the sounds she is making: I now 
experience those sounds as endowed with meaning by her, such that I take 
those noises as expressive signs.  
In a parallel manner, Husserl claims, in 1913/14, that authentic signs 
can be distinguished from indicators, because I experience authentic signs as 
signs that are created by another subject and I experience them as signs, 
which that other subject has created for the purpose of communicating with 
me, whereas I normally do not experience indicators as created by another 
subject or, if I do, I do not experience them as formulated for the sake of 
communication. Simply stated, authentic signs confront me as com-
munication, whereas indicators do not. Husserl writes, “In all cases, authentic 
signs are understood in the sense, that their meaning [Meinung] is to be 
understood as communication [Mitteilung] (that is, as the meaning of a 
communicator)” (Hua XX-2, p. 80).1  
In 1913/14, Husserl does not merely state that authentic signs are 
experienced as communicative, but he also introduces novel insights, which 
significantly augment his semiotics and his understanding of intersubjective 
communication. Those ideas transform how he conceives of; how I 
experience the subject that is communicating to me, how I experience the 
communicative signs, and how I experience myself as one who is being 
communicated with. Husserl comes to conclude that these changes are 
necessary, because he now recognizes that authentic signs carry with them 
two distinct, but interrelated elements; the “demand” (die Zumutung) and the 
“should” (das Sollen). As we shall see, by investigating these two elements, 
Husserl will additionally be able to pinpoint, in a more exact fashion, what 
distinguishes the experiences of authentic signs from the experiences of 
indicators.  
                                                     
1 While these conclusions are, in one sense, an adaptation of Husserl’s insights about 
the indicating or intimating function of expressive signs during communication, 
these ideas are also a radical reversal of another one of Husserl’s claims from 1901. 
Whereas Husserl believed, in the Investigations, that expressive signs can perform a 
communicative function, but that they are not necessarily or essentially 
communicative (in fact, in the Investigations, he is primarily or only interested in 
studying expressive signs within that monological context; cf. Hua XIX, pp. 41–
43/1970, pp. 189–190), in Revisions, Husserl defines authentic signs, including 
authentic categorial signs, as essentially communicative signs.  
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Husserl looks first at how I experience the “demand”. He states that 
the demand, which he is interested in describing, is, at least initially, the 
demand of some other subject. Moreover, the relevant demand is not a 
demand to do just anything, but rather a demand to understand the meaning 
of certain authentic signs. Husserl claims that I can experience this demand 
in the case where I see another subject who is creating authentic signs in an 
attempt to communicate with me. I there experience the other not only as one 
who is composing those signs, but also as one who is demanding me to 
understand them (Hua XX-2, p. 72). When my interlocutor presents those 
signs before me with communicative intent, I also experience her as 
demanding me to take those signs as authentic signs and to become aware of 
their meaning. Husserl writes, “All authentic signs have their origin in the 
[demand], which comes from a demanding subject” (Hua XX-2, p. 97). 
Husserl further clarifies the experience of this demand by returning to the 
example of the storm-siren. He states that when I hear the authentic storm-
siren signal, I also experience the coast guard, who has sounded the siren, as 
placing a demand on me. I experience the coast guard as demanding me to 
execute the corresponding appropriate intention, whereby I would become 
aware of the incoming cyclone.  
As a result of my experience of the demand, my perception of my 
interlocutor has changed: I see her not only as communicating, but also as 
demanding. And my perception of myself has changed: I see myself not only 
as one who is being communicated with, but also as a demanded subject. 
Husserl describes how a speaker places this demand on a listener and how 
that listener then experiences that demand, writing,  
The words receive their demand from a demanding and communicating sub-
ject, where the communicator executes the word (in speaking or in writing), 
such that he, the understanding subject, realizing the demand that attaches to 
the word, grasps the ‘thought’. The [understanding subject] thereby under-
stands the communicator as someone who means this and that with the words 
and as someone who wants to communicate the meant [Gemeint] to the other 
(Hua XX-2, p. 72).  
Not only my experience of the other and of myself is altered because of the 
demand, but also my experience of the authentic signs. I experience the 
authentic signs, which the other has produced, as possessing a “should” (Hua 
XX-2, p. 97. Cf. pp. 85–86; Melle 1998). The siren now manifests itself to 
me as something that I ought to or “should” take as a signal for the incoming 
cyclone. Husserl writes that, “Each communicative speech, each piece of 
writing, and further, every kind of speech, possesses this should” (Hua XX-2, 
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p. 97). Because the other has placed a demand on me to understand the signs, 
I experience the signs themselves as carrying a normative, if not even an 
ethical imperative to understand them. For example, if another were speaking 
to me in public and I did not take her words as communication and thus did 
not attempt to understand her, I would be ignoring the “should” of her signs 
and would thereby be acting in a rude or perhaps unethical manner.  
Husserl cashes out his insights about the demand and the should when 
he turns to analyze examples where I am confronted with an authentic sign 
when I am not experiencing the demand of another subject. For example, 
when I first open the pages of a book, Husserl asserts that, because the 
author, who composed her book to communicate with others, is not there 
demanding me to understand her written words, it is possible that I may not 
experience the demand of the author at all. Yet, if I did not experience the 
demand of the other, it seems that I would also not experience myself as a 
subject who is demanded to understand the words and that I would thus not 
experience the words as that which I should understand. 
Husserl asserts that I am yet still able to experience those scribbles as 
communicative signs, which I should understand, because a trace of the 
demand remains within the sign itself. This trace is the result of a certain 
habituation. During my previous communicative interactions with other 
subjects, when those other subjects spoke to me, they demanded me to 
understand their words. I always experienced spoken words as accompanied 
by the “personal” (personal) demands of other subjects. Because I have 
encountered word signs as always accompanied by these personal demands 
throughout my life, I have become accustomed or habituated to the fact that I 
am always demanded to understand linguistic signs. According to Husserl, 
over the course of time, by means of this habituation, the personal demands 
of the other subjects to understand their signs transfuses or percolates into the 
linguistic signs themselves. As a result, when the signs appear before me on 
the page, even if no subject is there to demand that I understand them, I still 
experience these written signs as something that I am demanded to 
understand. This demand, which I experience, does not arise from nowhere 
or no one, but rather comes from the signs themselves: I experience the signs 
as demanding me to understand them (Hua XX-2, pp. 97–98). In other 
words, via the habituation, the signs have become endowed (gestiftet) with 
the capacity to demand. Husserl writes that, “The thought of the [personal] 
demand can fall away or entirely withdraw, but it still remains the case that, 
as soon as I grasp the “sign” Z, I experience the [demand] to go over into and 
to terminate in the thematic consciousness of B” (Hua XX-2, p. 84). Husserl 
calls this demand, the “impersonal” (unpersonal) demand, because it comes 
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from no subject, but rather from the sign itself. Crucially, according to 
Husserl, once I experience the sign as demanding me to understand it, just as 
is the case when another demands me to understand it, I experience myself as 
demanded and the sign appears with its should. The sign is, in that case, 
performing both functions, as it demands me and appears to me as something 
I should understand. Husserl summarizes these conclusions by writing, 
We can also say: The habitual sign is a carrier of a practical demand, and 
truly an impersonal [unpersonalen] demand, which is no longer the conscious 
realization of previous willing. Instead of me demanding myself or someone 
else demanding me, it is the sign that so demands me, and it demands me 
purely in and of itself and not as a correlate of a personal demand (Hua XX–
2, p. 86).  
By working from these insights, Husserl is able to pinpoint what exactly 
separates indications from authentic signs. Even when I am not in the 
presence of a subject who is creating authentic signs and demanding me to 
understand them, authentic signs will always be experienced with the 
demand and with the should. In contrast, when they are correctly perceived, 
indicators will not manifest themselves with that demand or should. Husserl 
writes, “All authentic signs have their origin in a should [Sollen], which 
comes from and is imposed by a subject … This should [Sollen] is naturally 
lacking for indications” (Hua XX-2, p. 97). For example, when I see the 
indicating smoke on the horizon, I see it as something that no one has created 
to communicate with me, such that I do not experience the “demand” of any 
other subject to grasp the smoke as the indicator for the fire. Moreover, even 
though I can take the smoke as an indicator for the blaze, it is not the case 
that the smoke presents itself to me as something that I should take to be an 
indicator for the fire. I have not violated some normative or ethical 
imperative by not taking the smoke as the indicator for the fire. 
2.3 Signals and Categorial Signs 
In the third and final manuscript that will be examined in this essay (The 
expression of propositions is not a signifier, which makes the moments of the 
propositions into objects. The essential distinction between signum and 
verbum in comparison with image consciousness and with the expression of 
the soul in its bodily-ness. Hua XX-2, pp. 118–130; hereafter M3), Husserl 
addresses the division between non-categorial signals and categorial 
language signs. As elucidated, Husserl claimed in M1 that the distinction 
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between them is that the former are not categorially or grammatically 
structured and that the latter are. By working from and beyond these 
definitions, in M3, Husserl introduces new differences between these two 
kinds of signs. He discovers these novel distinctions by questioning the other 
central tenet of his 1901 semiotics. Is it truly the case, Husserl inquires, that 
all signs — and thus all signals and categorial signs — execute their 
operations in three steps? On the one hand, he concludes that signals 
certainly are experienced in three steps and he analyzes those three phases in 
detail. On the other hand, Husserl comes to affirm that categorial signs do not 
signify in three steps. Instead, he presents the novel idea that when I am 
presented with categorial signs, I pass through or beyond the words to the 
meant and expressed state of affairs all in one step. 
Husserl begins his analysis of M3 by examining the experiences of 
signals. In line with his conclusions from 1901, Husserl still asserts that 
signals are executed in three phases:  There is the intuitive consciousness of 
an apparent object, the experience of motivation, whereby I see that apparent 
object as a signal sign, and the execution of the motivated intending of the 
signaled (Hua XX-2, p. 118–121). Husserl not only reiterates these points 
from the Investigations, but also recognizes that his descriptions of those 
three steps from that text did not sufficiently elucidate our experiences of 
them. As such, in this manuscript, he executes a considerable analysis of 
these three stages and he thereby provides additional clarification to two 
elements of this whole three-step experience.  
First, Husserl emphasizes the difference between my consciousness of 
the apparent signal and my consciousness of the non-apparent signaled 
object. He claims that my intuitive awareness of the signal and my signitive 
intending of the signaled are two distinct consciousnesses, which have two 
distinct objects. He further asserts that there is a temporal difference between 
these two intentions. At point T1, I intuitively experience the signal and then, 
via the motivation originating from that signal, at point T2, I signitively 
intend the signaled object. He writes, “We are lead from the grasping of the 
sign, into a second consciousness, that is, of the signified state of affairs. The 
one consciousness is bound together with the other, and really in a temporal 
continuity, one follows after the other” (Hua XX-2, p. 124). As Husserl 
claims in this quote, he does not think that the two intendings are entirely 
disconnected; he believes that they are bound. Yet, he immediately clarifies 
that they are not fused together into one consciousness, but that they are 
rather, “externally bound” (Hua XX-2, p. 125). 
Husserl’s second novel or additional insight about the experience of 
signals concerns the nature of their motivation. He claims that when I see the 
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signal sign, I am motivated to transition directly from an awareness of the 
signal to a consciousness of the signaled object. Because this motivation 
makes me transition in such a straightforward and undeviating manner, 
Husserl claims that the motivation has an arrow-like quality: Just as the 
arrow leaves the archer’s bow and heads unswervingly to its target, so also 
does my consciousness shift directly from the signal to the signaled. He 
writes, “From the sign there goes a straight arrow [ein gerader Pfeil] to the 
state of affairs” (Hua XX-2, p. 126). According to Husserl, this straight-
forward guidance is the definitive characteristic not only of the signifying of 
signals, but of the signifying of all signs. Signification is, by definition, a 
linear arrow-like guidance from the apparent sign to the signified. Husserl 
writes, “One apprehends the sign and is thereby lead from this to the positing 
of that which is signified with the sign. The sign is constituted in an 
externally bound consciousness (äußerlich angeknüpften Bewusstsein); such 
that the togetherness (Zusammengehörigkeit) from Z to Gz is certainly: Z → 
G” (Hua XX-2, p. 125).  
When Husserl turns to examine what defines categorial authentic 
signs, he comes to the radically new conclusion of M3, that these signs do 
not execute their operation in three distinct phases.  He arrives at this insight 
for two interrelated reasons. First, he sees that there is no sharp distinction 
between the first and third steps of this process.  There is no strong division 
between my consciousness of the categorial sign and of its meant state of 
affairs, as there is between the experience of the signal and of its signaled. I 
do not experience the linguistic sign and then, subsequently, the state of 
affairs.  
In fact, Husserl claims that, during this experience, I am not 
thematically conscious — in the robust sense of the term — of the linguistic 
categorial signs at all, but am instead only thematically intending the meant 
state of affairs! He writes, “Freely, I do not make the sensuous sign into an 
object” (Hua XX-2, p. 126). Of course, when I am reading, I must be 
intending the authentic linguistic signs, if I am to be able to become aware of 
the meant state of affairs, but Husserl states that this intending of the words is 
not distinct or separate from the consciousness of the state of affairs.  The 
intuition of the word is not a whole intention in and of itself, but is rather 
subsumed into or united with the intending of the state of affairs from the 
start. There is, what Husserl calls, “a peculiar fusion” [eine eigentümliche 
Verschmelzung] (Hua XX-2, p. 129) between these two consciousnesses. As 
a result of this subsumption or fusion, the categorial signs do not become 
thematic to me, as I instead only attend to the meant state of affairs. Husserl 
writes, 
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I grasp the word and I live in the meaning-consciousness; the word as a 
Wortlaut remains not outside of the consciousness of the meaning [außerhalb 
des Bewusstseins der Bedeutung], because the word and the meaning collapse 
into a unity … in which the word and the word-forms ‘coincide’ [‘decken’] 
with the meaning and the meaning forms” (Hua XX-2, p. 126). 
The second reason Husserl believes that categorial signs do not perform their 
function in three steps concerns the second step of the three step process. He 
recognizes that the movement from the linguistic sign to its state of affairs is 
not, correctly considered, a transition at all. Whereas, when I perceive a 
signal, I experience a linear arrow-like motivation to go from the signal to 
the signaled, there is no true passage from the awareness of the categorial 
sign to another and distinct consciousness of the meant state of affairs. The 
fact that the intending of the word is subsumed into the intending of the 
meaning, can be justified when one recognizes that when I see the words, I 
immediately pass through or beyond those linguistic signs to the meant state 
of affairs. Because of the isomorphism, which obtains between the gram-
matically organized words (the word-forms) and the categorially structured 
meaning (the meaning-forms), when I see the former, I become instantly 
conscious of the latter, where — according to Husserl — there is no temporal 
difference between my execution of these intentions. He writes, 
I go over and beyond the word in a certain manner. It is however an entirely 
different kind of ‘going over and beyond’; it is no ‘going over and beyond’ 
into a second consciousness, which is externally bound with the first (Hua 
XX-2, p. 126).   
In coming to this conclusion, Husserl has fundamentally altered his 
understanding of linguistic signs. Because categorial language signs lack this 
pointing-beyond-themselves-to-another, and because — during his analysis 
of signals — Husserl defined the signitive function of a sign as this 
motivational arrow-like pointing to the signified, Husserl judges that 
language does not, technically considered, signify. The going-into or 
passing-through the linguistic signs to the state of affairs, is not an 
experience of the words signifying their signified, but instead, according to 
Husserl, the experience where words “mean” or “name” their meant states of 
affairs. As the experience of language is of a fundamentally different nature 
from signitive intentionality, Husserl believes that it should also be given a 
different name and he now calls it, “meaning-consciousness” (Bedeutungs-
bewusstsein). He asserts, “With this, we find the authentic meaning-intention, 
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[to be] in distinction from the signifying-intention. The word ‘signifies’ truly 
nothing, but rather it means and names” (Hua XX-2, p. 126). 
For these two reasons, in this third manuscript, Husserl renounces his 
1901 conclusion that all signs execute their operation in three steps. Because 
there is no true shift from the linguistic categorial signs to the meant state of 
affairs, there is no sharp distinction between them.  The word-consciousness 
and the meaning-consciousness are fused together, such that the categorial 
sign means and names its state of affairs immediately and at once. 
3 Phenomenological Semiotics 
Husserl’s 1913/14 revisions to his semiotics are, as has now been revealed, 
most extensive and significant. By returning to examine and describe the 
different ways one can be conscious of signs and their referents, Husserl 
realizes that those experiences are more complex and varied than he had 
previously thought. In the three manuscripts, which were examined 
throughout the second half of this essay, Husserl reverses the idea that there 
are indicators and expressive signs, instead claiming that there are indicators, 
signals, and signs. He also further spells out how signal signs can execute 
their signitive operation in three steps. Finally, he concludes, in contrast to 
his claims from the First Logical Investigation, that categorial linguistic signs 
do not signify their objects in three stages, as I instead immediately pass 
through the words to become aware of the state of affairs, which those words 
mean. 
Rather than further summarize the descriptions, which lead Husserl to 
these novel ideas, I find it prudent to conclude this essay by discussing how 
he composed these three research manuscripts.  
While I have attempted in this paper to consolidate the insights, which 
Husserl presents in Revisions, into a theory that is more or less coherent, the 
texts themselves are anything but. As in many of his research manuscripts, in 
these 1913/14 writings, Husserl does not seek to present systematic and 
decisive conclusions, but is rather proposing new possible ways to think 
about experience, which may or may not be accurate. In a stream-of-
consciousness like manner, he works through his proposals, testing them 
against the phenomena, overturning and returning to and overturning them 
again.  
This methodology; however, should not be conceived of as a drawback 
of Husserl’s writings. Because in these 1913/14 manuscripts, Husserl briefly 
investigates different suggestions about how we can think about the 
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experiences of signs and because he offers many questions, which he never 
attempts to provide an answer to, his writings place a demand on the reader, 
but one of a different kind than was examined above. When we read his 
manuscripts, we are not only demanded to think Husserl’s own thoughts. 
Because Husserl left many issues still unaddressed and because his writings 
open up so many possibilities, these research texts also demand us to think 
beyond them. We are called upon to employ Husserl’s questions and 
suggestions as an inspiration to develop our own hypotheses about the 
experiences of signs. By doing so and by taking part in the communal 
phenomenological project — of checking our theses against the things 
themselves for ourselves — we can work with and beyond the founder and 
master of phenomenology so as to develop a continually more accurate 
phenomenological semiotics.  
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